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Abstract
We conducted an experiment with 182 inmates from a maximum security prison
to analyze the impact of criminal identity salience on cheating. The results show
that inmates cheat more when we exogenously render their criminal identity more
salient. This eﬀect is speciﬁc to individuals who have a criminal identity, be-
cause an additional placebo experiment shows that regular citizens do not become
more dishonest in response to crime-related reminders. Moreover, our experimental
measure of cheating correlates with inmates’ oﬀenses against in-prison regulation.
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that criminal identity salience plays a crucial role
in rule violating behavior.
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1 Introduction
Crime imposes substantial costs on society. For example, it has been estimated that
the annual burden of crime for the United States ranges between one and two trillion
US dollars (Ludwig 2006, Anderson 1999).Understanding why people commit crime and
violate the law is therefore of key interest for policy makers and researchers. According
to the seminal work of Becker (1968), a person’s decision to commit crime is based on
weighing the expected material beneﬁts against the punishment costs.1 A longstanding
sociological and psychological literature argues, however, that in addition to rational
cost-beneﬁt calculations, the decision to commit or refrain from crime also crucially de-
pends on people’s moral and self-image considerations (see Anderson 2000, Kaplan 1975,
Reckless 1967, Becker 1963, or Cohen 1955).2 These views line up with recent theoretical
approaches in law and economics incorporating identity and norms into decision making
(see Acemoglu and Jackson 2014, Bénabou and Tirole 2011a,b, Posner 2009, McAdams
and Rasmusen 2007, and Akerlof and Kranton 2000). For example, people in Akerlof
and Kranton’s model have multiple social identities (e.g., based on gender, ethnicity, or
occupation) that are tied to norms prescribing how one should behave. Identities may
inﬂuence behavior because individuals experience disutility if their behavior deviates
from what their identities prescribe.
Applying identity theory to the context of crime, we propose that deviant people
have a moral and a criminal identity; these identities diﬀer in the extent to which they
impose rule compliance. Rule violating behavior inﬂicts psychological costs on the moral
identity (e.g., Abeler et al. 2014, Kartik 2009, or Gneezy 2005). Whenever these costs are
suﬃciently large relative to the net beneﬁt of rule violation, the moral identity prescribes
compliance. In contrast, the criminal identity does not suﬀer from moral costs (or suﬀers
to a much lesser extent) and thus prescribes, in accordance with Becker’s model, breaking
rules whenever it pays oﬀ. As a consequence, stronger criminal identiﬁcation should lead
to more rule violating behavior. While several correlational studies from criminology
indeed report a positive relationship between survey measures of criminal identity and
deviant behavior (see Gendreau et al. (1996) for a meta-analysis), these studies are
not able to disentangle whether criminal identity has a causal impact on rule violating
behavior or whether rule violating behavior leads to stronger criminal identiﬁcation.
Identifying the causal inﬂuence of criminal identity on rule violating behavior is
1See Draca and Machin 2015, Chalﬁn and McCrary 2014, or Nagin 2013 or for excellent reviews of
the empirical literature.
2These theories initiated an active literature in criminology developing psychological scales of criminal
self-concept (e.g., Simourd and Olver 2002).
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challenging. A simple comparison of criminals and non-criminals is problematic because
criminals and law-abiding citizens may diﬀer in many dimensions that are diﬃcult to con-
trol for, such as ﬁnancial background, life prospects, or opportunity costs.3 Instead, we
experimentally manipulate the saliency of criminal identity, which circumvents the afore-
mentioned problems involved in the comparison of people with diﬀerent levels of criminal
identiﬁcation. Identity theory posits that the extent to which individuals’ criminal and
moral identities guide their behavior depends on the relative weight (i.e., salience) they
attach to each identity at a given moment (see also Benjamin et al. 2010, 2013). Conse-
quently, a temporary boost in criminal identity salience reveals the identity’s marginal
behavioral eﬀect.
To test whether criminal identity salience triggers rule violating behavior, we con-
ducted an experiment with 182 inmates from the maximum security prison Pöschwies,
Switzerland’s largest penitentiary for male adults. We opted for this unusual subject
pool because prison inmates have plausibly a distinct criminal self-concept due to their
extensive histories of criminal misconduct (e.g., see Lerman 2009 or Walters 2003). In
our experiment, we randomly increased the saliency of criminal identity in half of the
participants using embedded survey questions that reminded them of the fact that they
are incarcerated criminals (e.g., “What were you convicted of?”). The other half of the
participants served as the control group and answered questions unrelated to their crim-
inal identity (e.g., “How many hours per week do you watch television on average?”).
The participants subsequently performed a simple coin tossing task, which allows us to
measure their dishonesty as a form of rule violating behavior. The rules of the task
required subjects to ﬂip ten coins and report the outcomes on paper. They were allowed
to keep every coin for which they reported “heads”, creating a monetary incentive to
break the rules and misreport the coin ﬂips. Because participants were unobserved, they
could easily hide behind chance and thus did not have to fear any punishment. We are
nevertheless able to measure cheating at the group level, as we know the distribution
which should result from honest reporting.4
The results show that a signiﬁcant share of the inmates cheated. On average, they re-
ported heads for 60 percent of the coin ﬂips in the control condition. This is signiﬁcantly
above chance and approximates 20 percent of coin ﬂips being misreported.5 However,
inmates became even more dishonest when their criminal identity was rendered more
3See Birkeland et al. (forthcoming), Khadjavi and Lange (2013), and Chmura et al. (2013) for studies
comparing distributive preferences and cooperation in criminals and non-criminals.
4See Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) or Houser et al. (2012) for similar approaches to elicit
dishonest behavior.
5In line with previous research on honesty our subjects did not take full advantage of cheating
opportunities (Ariely 2012).
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salient. In the criminal identity treatment, they reported 66 percent of heads which
corresponds to 32 percent of coin ﬂips being misreported. Thus, the higher saliency of
criminal identity increased the frequency of misreporting by 60 percent. Using admin-
istrative data, we further show that behavior in the coin tossing task correlates with
inmates’ oﬀenses against in-prison regulation (e.g., aggression against others, use of il-
legal drugs, or weapon possession), suggesting that the coin tossing task provides an
externally valid measure of rule violating behavior. Half a year after the main study, we
conducted a further experiment in the same prison which serves as a manipulation check.
Based on an implicit measure of criminal cognition we ﬁnd that the criminal identity
questions enhanced the mental accessibility of crime-related thoughts. This indicates
that the treatment manipulation worked as intended.
We discard several alternative explanations to a criminal identity eﬀect. For example,
one could argue that the questions might have triggered negative emotions and arousal
because they reminded prisoners about their deeds or the social injustice of incarcera-
tion (Sherman 1993). Such an emotional reaction could potentially undermine honesty.
However, we demonstrate that the criminal identity questions did not inﬂuence emotions,
and that the correlations between emotions and cheating are insigniﬁcant. Furthermore,
the saliency of criminal identity might have inﬂuenced inmates’ risk attitudes (Benjamin
et al. 2010). If inmates erroneously believed that cheating was individually detectable,
a decrease in risk aversion could also explain a higher cheating rate in the criminal iden-
tity treatment. We therefore elicited inmates’ risk attitudes and tested whether they are
correlated with earnings in the coin tossing task. The correlation is close to zero and
statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that a change in risk attitudes is unlikely to drive
the priming eﬀect.
Finally, the mere exposure to crime-related content, rather than the salience of crim-
inal identity, could have triggered dishonest behavior in the criminal identity treatment.
We therefore conducted an additional placebo experiment with “regular” citizens in order
to test whether the priming eﬀect is speciﬁc to people who have a criminal identity. We
recruited 193 male citizens from the general population and administered the same sur-
vey. Before answering the six crime-related or control questions, participants memorized
a short text proﬁle describing either a criminal or a non-criminal person. We created
these proﬁles using representative answers from the prisoners in the criminal identity,
respectively the control treatment. Subjects subsequently answered the same questions
as the prisoners from the perspective of the person described in the proﬁle. The results
show that the criminal proﬁle treatment had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on cheating. If
anything, the eﬀect goes in the opposite direction: the fraction of misreported coin ﬂips
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drops from 14 percent in the control condition to 10 percent in the criminal condition.
Together, the three studies suggest that criminal identity salience promotes rule violating
behavior.
Our results contribute to a growing literature studying the role of identity in economic
decision making (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Fang and Loury 2005, or Bénabou and
Tirole 2011a). The empirical literature mostly analyzed whether people discriminate
between in- and outgroup members (e.g., Hoﬀ and Pandey 2006, Charness et al. 2007,
Chen and Li 2009, Goette et al. 2012, or Kranton et al. 2012). One of the few exceptions
is the study by Benjamin et al. (2010) who used a similar approach to ours and analyzed
the inﬂuence of ethnic and gender identity salience on risk and time preferences. A more
recent study by Bertrand et al. (2013) illustrates that gender identity norms inﬂuence a
wide range of economic and social outcomes. They ﬁnd that the norm “wives should not
earn more than their husbands” helps explain female labor force participation, divorce,
and the division of home production within US households.6 We add to this literature
by providing causal evidence on the impact of identity salience on dishonest behavior.
In this sense our results are also relevant for the rapidly expanding literature on the
determinants of dishonesty (e.g., Cohn et al. 2014, Balafoutas et al. 2013, Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi 2013, Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013, Shalvi et al. 2011Mazar et al.
2008, or Gneezy 2005, ).
Our study may also be relevant for the problem of recidivism. Estimates from the
United States, for example, indicate that more than four out of ten released inmates
are rearrested within three years (Pew Center on the States 2011). Our results suggest
that one factor that may contribute to recidivism are so-called collateral consequences
of conviction. These are punishments that come in addition to the actual sentence and
include deprivation of civil rights, loss of professional licenses, or restricted access to
public beneﬁts (Travis 2002). Besides deterring people, collateral sanctions may increase
the probability of recidivism by reminding convicts of their criminal identities.
2 An Experiment Behind Bars
Design
We conducted our experiment in the maximum security prison Pöschwies - Switzerland’s
largest penitentiary for male adults. A total of 182 inmates participated in the exper-
iment. The majority of them were convicted of violent crimes (30%), followed by drug
6See also Alesina et al. (2013) on the historical origins of today’s gender identity norms.
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related crimes (26%), property crimes (24%), sex crimes (15%), and other types of crime
(5%). Almost two third (62%) were repeat oﬀenders. Participants had been incarcerated
for 2.7 years on average, with a minimum of 26 days and a maximum of 22.5 years.7
We sent an invitation for a survey study from the University of Zurich to all inmates.
Participants were assured of conﬁdentiality and that their individual data would not be
revealed to the prison authorities. Interested participants could choose their preferred
survey language among four options: German, English, Italian, and French. A few days
later, participants received an envelope containing the survey (see online appendix), and
a second smaller envelope they were instructed to open at a later point in time. We
ensured that the inmates completed the survey in private without being disturbed by
guards or other inmates. Inmates from single cells received the survey overnight, and
those who shared their cell with another inmate completed the survey while their cellmate
was working.8 The experiment was conducted within 24 hours in order to minimize the
possibility of cross-talk among inmates.
The ﬁrst part of the survey contained ﬁller questions on subjective wellbeing and
standard demographics. The second part comprised our key experimental manipulation.
We randomly primed half of the participants with their criminal identity by asking them
six questions that reminded them of the fact that they are incarcerated criminals (e.g.,
“What were you convicted for?” or “How long have you been in custody?”).9 The other
half of the participants served as the control group and answered six questions unrelated
to their criminal identity (e.g., “What is your favorite activity when you do not have
to work?” or “How many hours per week do you watch television on average?”). These
six questions were the only diﬀerence between the criminal identity and the control
treatment.10 Immediately after the priming, participants were asked to indicate their
current emotional state using non-verbal Self-Assessment Manikins (Bradley and Lang
1994).11 This allows us to identify potential emotional reactions to the priming questions.
Towards the end of the survey, subjects were instructed to open the second envelope
which contained ten coins, each worth 0.5 Swiss francs (or 0.55 US dollars). The rules
7See Table A1 in the appendix for further descriptive statistics of our sample. Table A4 in the
appendix shows descriptive statistics from the whole prison population in the year of the experiment.
The composition of participants is very similar to that of the total prison population.
8Working hours are staggered for inmates in double cells. Each inmate works for half a day.
9Priming is a method developed in psychology and refers to the activation of mental representations
through situational cues (Bargh and Chartrand 2000, Shih et al. 1999, or LeBoeuf et al. 2010). Priming
is now increasingly used in economics (e.g., Callen et al. forthcoming, Hoﬀ and Pandey forthcoming,
Benjamin et al. 2010, 2013, or Chen et al. 2010).
10In order to ensure a ceteris paribus comparison of the two treatments, we also matched the answer
formats of the two sets of questions.
11These measures have been shown to be consistently correlated with diﬀerent physiological measures,
such as heart rate and facial muscle contraction (Bradley and Lang 2000).
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required the participants to ﬂip the coins sequentially and to report the outcome on
paper. They were allowed to keep every coin for which they reported “heads”. If they
ﬂipped tails, they had to put the coin back into the envelope together with the survey,
which had to be handed over to the guards on the next morning. Participants thus had
a monetary incentive to cheat by misreporting the outcome of their coin ﬂips. The stake
size was sizable for the participants, considering that the maximum payoﬀ matched their
hourly wage in prison. Because participants could hide behind chance, it is impossible
to determine with certainty whether an individual cheated or not. They therefore did
not have to fear any adverse consequences from cheating. However, we are able to
infer the extent to which participants in diﬀerent groups cheated by comparing the
empirical distributions of reported heads with the binomial distribution implied by honest
behavior. Moreover, assuming that none of the participants cheated to his disadvantage
- reporting tails when the actual outcome was heads - we are able to calculate the
percentage of coin ﬂips that are misreported (see also Houser et al. 2012). Let h be the
percentage of reported heads and m the percentage of coin tosses being misreported.
The percentage of reported heads is therefore determined by
h = m  1 + (1 m)  0:5 = 0:5  (1 +m): (1)
If a participant cheats, he reports heads with probability 1. However, honest report-
ing implies that heads occurs only with probability 0.5. We can thus characterize the
percentage of coin tosses that are misreported by
m = 2  h  1: (2)
The last column of Table A1 in the appendix reports whether there are any systematic
diﬀerences between participants in the two treatment conditions and serves as a random-
ization check. The background characteristics appear well-balanced across treatments.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between groups in length of sentences, disciplinary
oﬀenses, re-oﬀending status, age, cognitive skills12, risk attitudes, or assignment to prison
section. Only the fraction of inmates in the conviction category “Other” is signiﬁcantly
lower (p < 0.05, 2 test) in the criminal identity treatment. Treatment diﬀerences in the
number of years in prison (p = 0.100, rank-sum test) and the share of inmates who com-
pleted compulsory school (p = 0.095, 2 test) are marginally signiﬁcant. These marginal
diﬀerences do not occur more frequently than chance would dictate. We nevertheless
control for all three variables in our regression analysis.
12Cognitive skills were elicited using Frederick’s (2005) cognitive reﬂection test.
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Framework and Hypotheses
We derive our hypotheses by adapting the identity framework from Benjamin et al.
(2010). We assume that inmates have a criminal identity and a moral identity. These
identities prescribe diﬀerent behaviors in the coin tossing task. As a consequence, an
internal conﬂict arises over appropriate behavior. We begin by formalizing the behavior
prescribed by the moral identity.
For the moral self, we assume that the decision to cheat depends on personal beneﬁts
and expected punishment (Becker 1968), as well as psychological costs of cheating (e.g.,
Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004, Gneezy 2005, Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Mazar
et al. 2008, Kartik 2009, or Abeler et al. 2014).13 Let xi 2 [0; 10] denote the number
of heads reported by inmate i and x0 be his true number of tossed heads. The moral
identity’s prescribed action xm is derived from maximizing the following utility function:
max
xi2[0;10]
EUi(xi) = (1  p)xi   p[1xi 6=x0f   (1  1xi 6=x0)xi]  (xi   x0)2; (3)
where p is the monitoring probability and f the ﬁne imposed when caught cheating, i.e.,
xi 6= x0.  denotes the psychological costs of cheating. Given that in our context the
probability of monitoring is zero, i.e., p = 0, the decision to cheat reduces to a tradeoﬀ
between monetary gains and psychological costs of cheating. Solving the maximization
problem yields the moral identity’s optimal action xm = x0 + 12 , which depends on the
true outcome x0 and the psychological costs of cheating . The larger the psychological
costs, the more xm corresponds to the true outcome x0.
In contrast to the moral identity, we assume that cheating imposes no psychologi-
cal costs on the criminal identity. Consequently, the action prescribed by the criminal
identity xc is derived from maximizing the following utility function:
max
xi2[0;10]
EUi(xi) = (1  p)xi   p[1xi 6=x0f   (1  1xi 6=x0)xi]: (4)
Given a monitoring probability of zero, the utility of the criminal identity is maximized
if heads is reported ten times, i.e., xc = 10. Thus, the criminal identity prescribes
cheating to the full extent. We further assume that a criminal person maximizes a
utility function that is a convex combination of the prescribed actions of his criminal
identity and moral identity. Deviating from the prescribed actions causes disutility. A
13Note that we use a reduced-form representation of lying costs and do not discriminate between
whether these costs arise from internal (e.g., self-image concerns) or external regulatory processes (e.g.,
social image concerns).
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criminal’s maximization problem can thus be characterized as follows:
max
xi2[0;10]
Ui =  w(s)(xi   xc)2   (1  w(s))(xi   xm)2: (5)
where 0  w(s)  1 is the weight placed on the criminal person’s criminal identity, and
1  w(s) is the relative importance of his moral identity. We assume that w(0) = 0 and
w0 > 0. s is the current strength of the criminal identity and has a permanent component
s, which may diﬀer between individuals. Environmental cues or primes can make the
criminal identity temporarily salient by a factor  (i.e., s = s  ), where  can take any
value between 0 and 1. A value of zero means that the criminal identity is not at all
salient, while a value of one means that the criminal identity is fully salient.14 Inserting
the preferred actions xc and xm into equation (5) and solving the maximization problem
gives the following optimal action for inmate i:
xi = w(s)  10 + (1  w(s))(x0 +
1
2
): (6)
The optimal action of a criminal with identity considerations is the weighted average
of the prescribed actions of his criminal identity and moral identity. By inducing an
inmate to think about his criminal background in our experiment, we increase the current
strength s of his criminal identity by a factor  and therefore augment the decision weight
attached to his criminal identity. According to equation (6), his optimal action xi shifts
toward the action the criminal identity prescribes which is xc = 10. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Inmates, on average, report more successful coin ﬂips in the criminal
identity treatment than in the control treatment.
Note that this prediction only applies to individuals who have a criminal identity.
If a person does not have a criminal identity (i.e., s = 0), crime-related primes do not
lead to more cheating because s = s   = 0. Consequently, our framework predicts that
non-criminals will not report more successful coin ﬂips if they are induced to think about
crime. We will return to this point when we discuss our placebo experiment with regular
citizens.
14Given that our subjects live behind bars their criminal identity may already be salient to some
extent in the control treatment (i.e.,  > 0). On the other hand, it seems also plausible that our
subjects distract themselves and do not think permanently about the fact that they are incarcerated
criminals (i.e.,  < 1 in the control group). The more salient criminal identities are in the control
condition, the less likely we will ﬁnd a treatment eﬀect.
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3 Experimental Results
We outline our results in four steps. First, we examine the impact of criminal identity
salience on cheating. Second, we validate our experimental measure of cheating by
showing that behavior in the coin tossing task is correlated with inmates’ oﬀenses against
in-prison regulation. Third, we analyze data from an additional experiment, which
provides a manipulation check for the identity priming. Finally, we present the result
from a placebo experiment conducted with subjects from the general population and test
whether the priming eﬀect is speciﬁc to criminals.
Criminal Identity and Cheating
The results from the coin tossing task show that many of the inmates cheated. On
average, they reported heads for 63 percent of the coin ﬂips, which is signiﬁcantly above
chance (95% conﬁdence interval: 60%, 66%15). Assuming that none of the prisoners
cheated to his disadvantage - reporting tails when the actual outcome was heads - we
estimate that 26 percent of the coin ﬂips were misreported (see Equation 2).
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the binomial distribution of the number of heads which
should theoretically result if everyone was honest, and the empirical distribution from the
control treatment. The latter is clearly skewed towards a higher number of heads than
honest behavior predicts. For example, while we should theoretically expect around 0.1
percent of the participants to win the maximum amount, almost 13 percent of the pris-
oners reported so (p < 0:001, Binomial test). The distribution from the criminal identity
treatment is even further shifted towards higher payoﬀs (see panel B). The outcome 10,
but also the outcomes of 8, 7 and 6 times heads were signiﬁcantly more frequent than
honest reporting would predict (p < 0:001, 0.007, 0.059, and 0.097, Binomial tests).
As a result, the average percentage of heads increased signiﬁcantly from 60 percent in
the control group to 66 percent in the criminal identity group (p = 0:017, rank-sum test),
as shown in panel C.16 The corresponding rates of misreported coin ﬂips are 20 percent,
and 32 percent respectively, suggesting that cheating is 60 percent more frequent in the
criminal identity than in the control treatment. Interestingly, most of the treatment
eﬀect comes from incomplete cheaters (i.e., those who report 6, 7 and 8 times heads),
arguably those who face a stronger tension between their moral and criminal identity.
15The conﬁdence interval is based on individual averages to account for the fact that reporting behavior
could be correlated within individuals.
16All p-values reported in this paper are based on two-sided tests except for the Binomial tests which
are based on directed hypotheses.
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Figure 1: Criminal identity and cheating in inmates
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Panel A of this ﬁgure shows the distribution of heads reported by the prisoners in the control
treatment and the binomial distribution honest reporting implies. Panel B depicts the distribution
of heads in the criminal identity treatment and the binomial distribution. Panel C compares the
average percentage of heads reported in the control and in the criminal identity treatments.
The regression results shown in Table 1 are in line with the preceding nonparametric
analysis. We estimate a Probit model of the following form:
Pr(headsik = 1) = ( +   Ci +  Xi + ik): (7)
The decision of individual i to report heads for coin toss k is regressed on the crim-
inal identity treatment dummy Ci. We additionally control for the residual category of
convictions, the number of years in prison, and compulsory schooling level in the vec-
tor Xi, because these variables were imperfectly balanced across treatments. ik is the
idiosyncratic error term (standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the individual
level). () is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
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Table 1: Regression analysis: Criminal identity and cheating
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: heads = 1
Criminal identity 0.061 0.069 0.071
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Arousal -0.011
(0.007)
Negative emotions 0.012
(0.007)
Risk attitudes -0.000
(0.006)
Additional controls: no yes yes
Observations 1820 1730 1630
Subjects 182 173 163
This table reports average marginal eﬀects from a probit model. Robust standard errors, corrected for
clustering on the individual level, are displayed in parentheses. In column (1), the decision to report
heads is regressed on the criminal identity treatment dummy. Column (2) additionally controls for the
residual category of convictions, the number of years in prison, and compulsory schooling level, because
these variables were imperfectly balanced across treatments. Column (3) also controls for arousal,
negative emotions, and risk attitudes. Due to item non-response, the number of observations drops
when adding covariates. Signiﬁcance levels:  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
The average treatment eﬀect reported in column (1) of Table 1 reveals that the
probability of reporting heads in the criminal identity treatment is 6.1 percentage points
higher than in the control condition (p = 0:035). As shown in column (2), the estimate
of the treatment eﬀect is even slightly larger when we include the additional background
characteristics as control variables (p = 0:026).17 These ﬁndings are summarized in the
following result:
Result 1: Prisoners cheat more when their criminal identity is made more salient.
We tested the relevance of alternative interpretations. First, being reminded of one’s
criminal activity or the social injustice of being incarcerated (Sherman 1993) might have
provoked arousal and negative emotions which may have aﬀected dishonesty. We mea-
sured participants’ arousal and aﬀective state immediately after the priming questions
using validated non-verbal Self-Assessment Manikins (Bradley and Lang 1994). How-
ever, the results show that the saliency of criminal identity neither had an eﬀect on
17We alternatively estimated a linear probability model using ordinary least squares (OLS) which
yielded the same results.
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arousal (p = 0:237, rank-sum test) nor on negative aﬀect (p = 0:280, rank-sum test).
Second, the criminal identity manipulation might have altered criminals’ risk atti-
tudes (see Benjamin et al. 2010), and thus possibly also their inclination to cheat. Even
though it was impossible to detect whether an individual participant cheated, one could
argue that some participants erroneously believed that they might get caught and that
this would entail negative consequences for them. We elicited inmates’ risk attitudes
prior to the priming using an experimentally validated questionnaire measure of risk
attitudes (Dohmen et al. 2011). We found no signiﬁcant relationship between individual
risk attitudes and behavior in the coin tossing task (Spearman’s  =  0:017, p = 0:820).
Furthermore, we re-estimated model (7) and controlled for arousal, negative aﬀect,
and risk attitudes. Column (3) of Table 1 shows that none of these variables reaches
statistical signiﬁcance and the coeﬃcient estimate for the criminal identity treatment
remains unchanged (p = 0:024). Together, these results suggest that neither emotions
nor risk attitudes are able to explain the treatment eﬀect.
Third, it could be that the prisoners were not completely honest when we asked them
about their oﬀenses in order to appear less of a bad person. This could have spilled over
to the coin tossing task and undermined honest reporting. For example, it may be easier
to rationalize dishonest behavior if one had just lied. If that were the case, it would
not be the saliency of criminal identity, but a form of moral disengagement that in-
creased cheating in the criminal identity condition. To test this conjecture, we examined
how many prisoners misreported their convictions in the questionnaire (by comparing
self-reports to administrative records). Only 7 percent of the prisoners’ answers are in-
consistent, and an additional 5 percent of prisoners failed to answer the question. We
re-estimated our main regression model (7) and restricted the sample to inmates who
reported their convictions truthfully. If misreporting in the criminal identity question-
naire induced dishonesty in the subsequent coin tossing task we should observe a weaker
or no priming eﬀect in the restricted sample. However, the regression results in Table
2 show that the treatment eﬀect remains virtually the same when we exclude inmates
who did not provide truthful responses (columns 1 and 2), or additionally also exclude
inmates who did not answer the question (columns 3 and 4).18
18More generally, one could also think of our result as a self-consistency eﬀect, i.e., prisoners may
want to behave consistently with their recollection of their previous crimes. Such a self-consistency
eﬀect is closely related to the concept of identity because individuals often deﬁne themselves through
their past behavior (Bem 1972). Hence, reminding prisoners of their criminal past should make their
criminal identity more salient. The idea that individuals consider their past behavior to infer their
identity is also shared by the recent economic literature on identity. For example, Bénabou and Tirole
(2011a) propose a model where individuals only imperfectly recall their sense of identity and use past
behavior as a signal for who they are. In a ﬁeld experiment, Kessler and Milkman (2014) show that
reminding charitable donors of their past donations increases current giving, and that the eﬀect is more
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Table 2: Robustness checks: Consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: heads = 1
Criminal identity 0.062 0.072 0.063 0.076
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
Additional controls: no yes no yes
Observations 1690 1600 1600 1510
Subjects 169 160 160 151
Sample: conviction is... truthful or not reported truthful
This table reports average marginal eﬀects from a probit model. Robust standard errors, corrected
for clustering on the individual level, are displayed in parentheses. The decision to report heads is
regressed on the criminal identity treatment dummy. In column (1) and (2) the sample is restricted to
inmates providing truthful (i.e., consistent with administrative records) or no information concerning
their conviction. In columns (3) and (4) we additionally excluded inmates who did not provide informa-
tion concerning their conviction from the sample. The additional controls in column (2) and (4) are the
residual category of convictions, the number of years in prison, and compulsory schooling level, because
these variables were imperfectly balanced across treatments. Due to item non-response, the number of
observations drops when adding covariates. Signiﬁcance levels:  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
Validity of the Coin Tossing Task
We present complementary evidence showing that the coin tossing task provides a valid
measure of rule violating behavior. We were given access to the anonymized administra-
tive records of disciplinary oﬀenses for each participant. Typical oﬀenses are aggression
against others, drug or weapon possession, and other kinds of illegal activities. The aver-
age inmate had a record of two disciplinary oﬀenses since the beginning of incarceration.
We used this information to test whether behavior in the coin tossing task correlates
with inmates’ institutional behavior and estimated the following model using OLS:
yi =  +  Hi +   Ti +  Xi + i: (8)
We regressed the number of oﬀenses yi committed by inmate i since incarceration on
the percentage of reported heads Hi in the coin tossing task. We control for the diﬀerent
windows of opportunity using the time each criminal spent in prison Ti as an additional
explanatory variable. We further estimated a model, where we control for a large set of
additional criminal background measures Xi. i is the idiosyncratic error term. Column
(1) of Table 3 shows that, on average, inmates who reported ten times heads committed
pronounced for individuals who donate on a regular basis. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing
this out.
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two more oﬀenses in prison than those who reported heads in 50 percent of the cases
(p = 0:034). This diﬀerence corresponds to roughly ﬁve additional years of imprisonment
(see coeﬃcient estimate for “Years in prison”). The regression results are robust even
when we control for criminal background and socio-economic characteristics, as shown
in columns (2) and (3).19 The following result summarizes these ﬁndings:
Result 2: Behavior in the coin tossing experiment correlates with rule violating behavior
in prison.
Table 3: Prison rule violations and behavior in the coin tossing task
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: # of disciplinary oﬀenses
Percentage of heads 0.040 0.037 0.037
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Years in prison 0.404 0.279 0.433
(0.109) (0.109) (0.140)
Criminal background controls:
Type of conviction no yes yes
Repeat oﬀender no yes yes
Prison section no yes yes
Socio-economic controls:
Age no no yes
Nationality no no yes
Education no no yes
Observations 182 182 159
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. In
column (1), the number of disciplinary oﬀenses is regressed on the percentage of heads reported and the
number of years in prison. Column (2) includes additional criminal background controls, such as type of
conviction, repeat oﬀender status, and prison section. We do not control for sentence length because it
is not determined for more than one-third of the sample (early imprisonment and safe custody). Column
(3) also controls for age, nationality, and education. Signiﬁcance levels:  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p
< 0.01.
Manipulation Check
Six months after the main study we conducted a second experiment with 119 inmates
from the same prison using the same procedure. The goal of this follow-up experiment
19We alternatively treated disciplinary oﬀenses as count data and estimated a negative binomial
regression model which yielded similar results.
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was to measure the impact of the priming questions on criminal cognition, which serves
as a manipulation check.
The ﬁrst part of the follow-up survey included new ﬁller questions, mostly on sub-
jective wellbeing (see online appendix). The second part contained exactly the same six
priming questions as in the previous experiment.20 Following the six priming questions,
participants solved a word stem completion task. For example, they could complete
the word stem “oﬀ...” with the crime-related word “oﬀense” or unrelated words such
as “oﬃce”. The other two word stems were “acc...” (e.g., accusation vs. account) and
“pol...” (e.g., police vs. politics). A research assistant who was blind to the experimental
conditions categorized the answers into crime-related and unrelated words. This allows
us to compare the mental accessibility of crime-related constructs across treatments.
As depicted in Figure 2, the mental accessibility of crime-related constructs was
eﬀectively manipulated. In comparison to the control condition, the participants in the
criminal identity treatment mentioned crime-related words almost twice as frequently
(p = 0:008, rank-sum test).
Result 3: In comparison with the control treatment, the criminal identity treatment
increased the mental saliency of crime-related constructs, suggesting that the treatment
manipulation worked as intended.
Placebo Experiment with Regular Citizens
We conducted an additional placebo experiment with subjects from the general popula-
tion in order to further consolidate our results with an eﬀect of criminal identiﬁcation.
An alternative explanation for the previous ﬁndings is that not the salience of criminal
identity per se, but rather crime-related thoughts in general, increased cheating. It is
conceivable that exposure to crime-related content evoked semantically related thoughts
and thereby lowered moral standards. This alternative mechanism would imply that
regular citizens react similarly to crime-related priming questions. In contrast, our iden-
tity framework predicts that non-criminal subjects will not react to crime-related cues
2069 inmates had already participated in the ﬁrst experiment; the other 50 inmates participated
for the ﬁrst time. Table A2 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the participants of
the manipulation check. The randomization check in the last column suggests that all background
characteristics are well balanced across treatments. Treatments were randomly assigned for subjects who
participated for the ﬁrst time. We reversed treatment assignment for subjects who already participated
in the main experiment: those who originally answered the criminal identity questions received the
control questions instead, and vice versa. Seven subjects received the same treatment in the main
experiment and the manipulation check by mistake. The results are robust to excluding these subjects.
15
Figure 2: Manipulation check
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This ﬁgure shows the average percentage of crime-related
words in the word completion task by treatment.
because they do not have a criminal identity that can be made more salient (i.e., s = 0
and therefore s = s   = 0).21
To test this prediction, we recruited 193 male visitors from the resident registration
oﬃce of a Swiss municipality.22 We deliberately chose a municipality characterized by
a relatively high proportion of foreigners in order to recruit participants with a similar
cultural background to that of the prisoners. Moreover, recruitment at the registration
oﬃce allowed us to approach representative citizens of the chosen community.23 The
experimental design and procedure followed the prisoners’ experiment as closely as pos-
sible. Participants were assured that their answers would be treated conﬁdentially, and
they could choose their preferred survey language among the same four options. Subjects
received an envelope that contained the survey, and a second smaller envelope with ten
0.5 Swiss franc coins. Participants ﬁlled out the survey alone in an empty room at the
resident registration oﬃce, ensuring the same degree of privacy during the experiment.
They received an additional ﬁxed show up fee of 10 Swiss francs in order to compensate
21See LeBoeuf et al. (2010) for evidence that identity priming only aﬀects behavior if subjects have
the primed identity.
22We cannot rule out that some of our subjects might have committed crimes because we do not know
their criminal histories. However, if some of the subjects were indeed criminals, their presence would
work against our prediction, making the test even stronger.
23Citizens mostly visit the registration oﬃce to receive or renew oﬃcial documents, such as passports
and residency permits.
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them for their higher opportunity costs of time. The survey was identical to that ad-
ministered to the prisoners, except for the treatment manipulation, which needed to be
adjusted slightly. Before answering the crime or control questions, participants had to
memorize a short text proﬁle of a person. They were randomly assigned to a proﬁle of
a criminal or a non-criminal person. We created these proﬁles using representative an-
swers from the prisoners in the criminal identity and the control treatment, respectively
(see online appendix). Subjects subsequently answered the same six priming questions
as the prisoners but from the perspective of the person described in the proﬁle. After
the quiz, participants were asked to open the second envelope and to complete the coin
tossing task. At the end of the experiment, participants returned the sealed envelopes
by putting them into a box placed in the corner of the room. Table A3 in the appendix
presents descriptive statistics and the randomization check for the placebo experiment.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatments for any of the elicited background
characteristics, with the exception of vocation schooling(p = 0:043; 2 test), suggesting
that the randomization was successful.
The results show that the general population reported, on average, 56 percent of
heads in the coin tossing task (95% conﬁdence interval: 53%, 59%). This corresponds
to 12 percent misreporting. Thus, participants from the general population cheated too,
but to a lesser extent than the criminals (p = 0:004, rank-sum test). A clear diﬀerence
between the sample of criminals and the non-criminal population is the occurrence of
the payoﬀ maximizing outcome. While the criminals in the control treatment reported
ten times heads in 13 percent of cases, the same outcome is observed only in 4 percent of
cases in the control group of the non-criminal population (p = 0:031, 2 test). However,
these diﬀerences should be interpreted cautiously, because they could also be attributed
to unobserved factors which diﬀer between the two social groups. The relevant question
is whether the treatment inﬂuenced cheating within the general population.
Panel A of Figure 3 contrasts the binomial distribution of heads with the empirical
distribution observed in the control group of the general population. The distribution is
shifted to the right, suggesting that individuals over-reported the number of heads. In
contrast to the experiment with the prisoners, the distribution from the criminal proﬁle
treatment is very similar to that in the control treatment, as shown in panel B. Panel
C highlights that the average percentage of heads is even slightly lower in the criminal
proﬁle (55 percent heads or 10 percent misreporting) compared to the control treatment
(57 percent of heads or 14 percent misreporting), but not signiﬁcantly so (p = 0.240,
rank-sum test). Thus, if anything, the general population tended to cheat less when
primed with the criminal proﬁle rather than the control proﬁle. Overall, the results from
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Figure 3: Crime-related reminders and cheating in regular citizens
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Panel A of this ﬁgure shows the distribution of heads reported by the non-criminal population in
the control treatment and the binomial distribution implied by honest reporting. Panel B depicts
the distribution of heads in the criminal identity treatment and the binomial distribution. Panel C
compares the average percentage of heads reported in the control and criminal identity treatment.
the placebo experiment suggest that the priming eﬀect is speciﬁc to criminals and is thus
consistent with a criminal identity eﬀect. This is summarized in the ﬁnal result:
Result 4: Regular citizens do not cheat more when crime-related concepts are rendered
more salient.
Note that this result is consistent with the self-concept maintenance theory proposed
by Mazar et al. (2008). According to their framework, a moral prime renders non-criminal
subjects more honest because it reminds them of their own moral standards. Our prime,
however, was based on the immoral behavior of a third person. One could even argue
that when subjects are asked to think about the crimes of another person, their moral
self-image is threatened and they therefore engage in counteractive behavior (see Zhong
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and Liljenquist 2006). This might explain why subjects in the criminal proﬁle condition
tended to be more honest than those in the control condition.
4 Conclusion
We study the impact of criminal identity salience on rule violating behavior in 182
inmates from a maximum security prison. We experimentally manipulated the saliency
of their criminal identity and subsequently measured their dishonesty in an incentivized
coin tossing task. Our results show that prisoners cheated substantially more when their
criminal identity was rendered more salient. This eﬀect is speciﬁc to individuals with a
criminal identity, as we did not ﬁnd any inﬂuence of crime-related reminders in a placebo
experiment with regular citizens. Furthermore, we show that our experimental measure
of dishonesty correlates with inmates’ disciplinary oﬀenses. Together, these ﬁndings
suggest that criminal identity salience plays a crucial role in rule violating behavior and
also support recent theoretical endeavors incorporating identity into economic models of
decision making (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Fang and Loury 2005, and Bénabou
and Tirole 2011a).
It may seem surprising that we were able to increase the saliency of criminal identity
of maximum security prisoners given that they are locked in an environment which
constantly reminds them of their criminal identities. However, our results from both the
coin tossing task and the manipulation check suggest that everyday prison life does not
necessarily render inmates’ criminal identities maximally salient at all times. Inmates
are probably able to distract themselves and therefore habituate to the permanent cues
in their environment.
From a policy perspective, our results raise the possibility that legal sanctions can
have side eﬀects with unintended consequences. Convictions often come along with
collateral consequences, such as deprivations of civil rights, loss of professional licenses, or
restricted access to public beneﬁts (Travis 2002). The intended deterrent eﬀects of these
consequences may come at the cost of reminding convicts of their criminal identity, which
may increase their risk for relapse. As discussed above, however, permanent reminders
are potentially less problematic than intermittent or novel cues. Identifying the extent
to which the saliency of criminal identity counteracts the deterrent eﬀects of collateral
consequences is therefore an important avenue for future research.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the main experiment
Total sample Criminal identity Control
N = 182 N = 90 N = 92
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Type of conviction:
Violent crimes 0.297 (0.458) 0.256 (0.439) 0.337 (0.475) 0.229
Drug-related crimes 0.264 (0.442) 0.278 (0.450) 0.250 (0.435) 0.671
Property crimes 0.242 (0.429) 0.267 (0.445) 0.217 (0.415) 0.438
Sex crimes 0.148 (0.356) 0.189 (0.394) 0.109 (0.313) 0.128
Other 0.049 (0.217) 0.011 (0.105) 0.087 (0.283) 0.018
Repeat oﬀender 0.621 (0.487) 0.567 (0.498) 0.674 (0.471) 0.136
Sentences:
Sentence length (if known) 4.574 (4.364) 5.082 (4.580) 4.065 (4.114) 0.167
Safe custody 0.176 (0.382) 0.178 (0.384) 0.174 (0.381) 0.945
Early imprisonment 0.176 (0.382) 0.167 (0.375) 0.185 (0.390) 0.748
Years in prison 2.659 (3.922) 3.055 (4.433) 2.272 (3.326) 0.100
Prison section:
Double cell 0.352 (0.479) 0.367 (0.485) 0.337 (0.475) 0.675
Single cell (normal) 0.368 (0.484) 0.356 (0.481) 0.380 (0.488) 0.728
Single cell (special) 0.280 (0.450) 0.278 (0.450) 0.283 (0.453) 0.942
No. of disciplinary oﬀenses 2.187 (4.371) 2.533 (4.432) 1.848 (4.307) 0.131
Nationality:
Swiss 0.322 (0.468) 0.369 (0.485) 0.276 (0.450) 0.192
South-eastern European 0.298 (0.459) 0.262 (0.442) 0.333 (0.474) 0.307
African 0.146 (0.354) 0.143 (0.352) 0.149 (0.359) 0.903
Central European 0.123 (0.329) 0.107 (0.311) 0.138 (0.347) 0.540
Other 0.111 (0.315) 0.119 (0.326) 0.103 (0.306) 0.746
Age 38.341 (11.306) 39.246 (12.059) 37.497 (10.553) 0.479
Highest completed education:
Compulsory school 0.376 (0.486) 0.437 (0.499) 0.314 (0.467) 0.095
Vocational school 0.347 (0.477) 0.345 (0.478) 0.349 (0.479) 0.956
High school 0.087 (0.282) 0.057 (0.234) 0.116 (0.322) 0.169
Teaching diploma 0.023 (0.151) 0.011 (0.107) 0.035 (0.185) 0.306
Adv. vocational school 0.104 (0.306) 0.115 (0.321) 0.093 (0.292) 0.637
Univ. of applied sciences 0.035 (0.184) 0.023 (0.151) 0.047 (0.212) 0.398
University 0.029 (0.168) 0.011 (0.107) 0.047 (0.212) 0.169
Risk attitudes 5.392 (3.036) 5.163 (2.854) 5.626 (3.212) 0.294
Cognitive skills 0.676 (0.974) 0.778 (1.036) 0.576 (0.905) 0.152
Survey language:
German 0.709 (0.456) 0.722 (0.450) 0.696 (0.463) 0.693
English 0.126 (0.333) 0.111 (0.316) 0.141 (0.350) 0.540
Italian 0.099 (0.299) 0.089 (0.286) 0.109 (0.313) 0.655
French 0.066 (0.249) 0.078 (0.269) 0.054 (0.228) 0.524
All variables are binary, except for sentence length (in years), years in prison, number of disciplinary oﬀenses, age (in
years), risk attitudes (from 0 “not at all willing to take risks” to 10 “fully willing to take risks”), and cognitive skills (score
in the cognitive reﬂection test ranging from 0 to 3). “Single cell (normal)” and “Single cell (special)” means single cell
in normal, respectively special correction facility. Sentence length is known for 118 subjects. Due to item non-response,
11 observations are missing for nationality, 8 for age, 9 for education, and 6 for risk attitudes. The last column presents
p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (2 tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests in case
of interval variables).
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the manipulation check
Total sample Criminal identity Control
N = 119 N = 52 N = 67
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Type of conviction:
Violent crimes 0.319 (0.468) 0.346 (0.480) 0.299 (0.461) 0.580
Drug-related crimes 0.269 (0.445) 0.327 (0.474) 0.224 (0.420) 0.209
Property crimes 0.218 (0.415) 0.192 (0.398) 0.239 (0.430) 0.543
Sex crimes 0.151 (0.360) 0.096 (0.298) 0.194 (0.398) 0.139
Other 0.042 (0.201) 0.038 (0.194) 0.045 (0.208) 0.865
Repeat oﬀender 0.538 (0.501) 0.519 (0.505) 0.552 (0.501) 0.720
Sentences:
Sentence length (if known) 5.649 (4.260) 4.674 (3.295) 6.327 (4.746) 0.131
Safe custody 0.218 (0.415) 0.250 (0.437) 0.194 (0.398) 0.464
Early imprisonment 0.269 (0.445) 0.269 (0.448) 0.269 (0.447) 0.994
Years in prison 2.522 (4.005) 2.246 (3.787) 2.736 (4.181) 0.183
Prison section:
Double cell 0.303 (0.461) 0.308 (0.466) 0.299 (0.461) 0.914
Single cell (normal) 0.319 (0.468) 0.250 (0.437) 0.373 (0.487) 0.153
Single cell (special) 0.378 (0.487) 0.442 (0.502) 0.328 (0.473) 0.204
No. of disciplinary oﬀenses 2.571 (5.148) 2.442 (5.707) 2.672 (4.711) 0.226
Survey language:
German 0.840 (0.368) 0.808 (0.398) 0.866 (0.344) 0.392
English 0.084 (0.279) 0.096 (0.298) 0.075 (0.265) 0.675
Italian 0.050 (0.220) 0.077 (0.269) 0.030 (0.171) 0.244
French 0.025 (0.157) 0.019 (0.139) 0.030 (0.171) 0.714
All variables are binary, except for sentence length (in years), years in prison, and number of disciplinary oﬀenses. “Single
cell (normal)” and “Single cell (special)” means single cell in normal, respectively special correction facility. Sentence
length is known for 61 subjects. The last column presents p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (2
tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests in case of interval variables).
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics of the placebo experiment
Total sample Criminal proﬁle Control
N = 193 N = 98 N = 95
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Nationality:
Swiss 0.587 (0.494) 0.573 (0.497) 0.602 (0.492) 0.683
South-eastern European 0.106 (0.308) 0.083 (0.278) 0.129 (0.337) 0.307
African 0.011 (0.103) 0.010 (0.102) 0.011 (0.104) 0.982
Central European 0.243 (0.430) 0.271 (0.447) 0.215 (0.413) 0.372
Other 0.053 (0.224) 0.063 (0.243) 0.043 (0.204) 0.550
Age 41.605 (17.155) 42.930 (18.236) 40.251 (15.963) 0.424
Highest completed education:
Compulsory school 0.095 (0.294) 0.126 (0.334) 0.064 (0.246) 0.143
Vocational school 0.365 (0.483) 0.295 (0.458) 0.436 (0.499) 0.043
High school 0.106 (0.308) 0.137 (0.346) 0.074 (0.264) 0.163
Teaching diploma 0.037 (0.189) 0.021 (0.144) 0.053 (0.226) 0.242
Adv. vocational school 0.175 (0.381) 0.158 (0.367) 0.191 (0.396) 0.543
Univ. of applied sciences 0.095 (0.294) 0.116 (0.322) 0.074 (0.264) 0.333
University 0.127 (0.334) 0.147 (0.356) 0.106 (0.310) 0.397
Risk attitudes 5.940 (2.423) 5.724 (2.503) 6.165 (2.330) 0.259
Cognitive skills 1.228 (1.186) 1.245 (1.149) 1.211 (1.228) 0.722
Survey language:
German 0.938 (0.242) 0.929 (0.259) 0.947 (0.224) 0.589
English 0.041 (0.200) 0.041 (0.199) 0.042 (0.202) 0.964
Italian 0.005 (0.072) 0.010 (0.101) 0.000 (0.000) 0.324
French 0.016 (0.124) 0.020 (0.142) 0.011 (0.103) 0.579
All variables are binary, except for age (in years), risk attitudes (from 0 “not at all willing to take risks” to 10 “fully willing
to take risks”), and cognitive skills (score in the cognitive reﬂection test ranging from 0 to 3). Due to item non-response, 4
observations are missing for nationality and education, 11 for age, 1 for risk attitudes. The last column presents p-values
for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (2 tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests in case of interval
variables).
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics of total prison population based on the annual report.
Variable Total (N = 422) in %
Nationality:
Swiss 111 26%
South-eastern European 120 28%
African 72 17%
Central European 45 11%
Other 74 18%
Age:
29 years or younger 122 29%
30-39 years 126 30%
40-49 years 97 23%
50-59 years 62 15%
60 years or older 15 4%
Sentence length (if known):
less than 6 months 19 5%
6-12 months 3 1%
1-2 years 8 2%
2-3 years 37 9%
3-5 years 69 16%
5-10 years 87 21%
10-20 years 43 10%
more than 20 years 4 1%
Safe custody 82 19%
Early imprisonment 70 17%
Type of conviction:
Violent crimes 121 29%
Drug-related crimes 118 28%
Property crimes 79 19%
Sex crimes 56 13%
Other 48 11%
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